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Notes & Comments
Stre(a)tching the 1972 Amendments to the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act
By Edward Francis Cotter,Jr.*

In 1972, Congress enacted amendments to the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act' (LHWCA). The LHWCA is
a statutory compensation scheme similar to the workers' compensation
systems available to land based workers. A major purpose of the 1972
amendments was to increase the benefits available to longshoremen 2
under the LHWCA. 3 During the congressional hearings on the 1972
amendments, an increase in compensation benefits was resisted by employers who claimed that they not only were compelled to make
LHWCA payments but also were forced on occasion to indemnify vessel owners 4 who were held liable to injured longshoremen under the
maritime absolute liability doctrine of unseaworthiness. 5 Thus the stevedore employer had to pay twice for the same injury. To eliminate
this potential for double payment and gain employer support for the
amendments, Congress enacted section 18(a) of the LHWCA, codified
at section 905(b) of Title 33 of the United States Code, which eliminated the unseaworthiness remedy for injured longshoremen and provided that negligence would be the longshoremen's exclusive remedy
*

B.S., 1973, United States Naval Academy. Member, Third Year Class.

1. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976) (added by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86
Stat. 1251).
2. A longshoreman is generally defined as "[a] laborer, such as a stevedore or loader,
who works about wharves of a seaport." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1093 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
3. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4698-99.
4. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1(1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4699.
5. See text accompanying notes 22-45, 83-91 infra. See also HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor andPublic Welfare on the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 28-33
(1972) (statement of James D. Hodgson); HearingsBefore the Select Subcomm. on Laborof
the House Comm. on Education and Labor on the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 46-50 (1972) (statement of
James D. Hodgson).
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6
against vessel owners.
Despite this apparent express congressional intent to limit the remedy against vessel owners to a negligence action, in the 1975 decision in
Streatch v. Associated Container Transporation, Ltd 7 a district court
concluded that section 905(b) did not preclude recovery under a common law strict products liability theory in an action by an injured longshoreman against the owner of the vessel upon which the
longshoreman was working. This Note discusses the Streatch decision
and its novel approach to the question of whether injured longshoremen should be restricted to the exclusive negligence action against a
vessel owner provided in section 905(b). The Note first describes the
inception of the longshoremen's compensation system in 1927 and the
effect of a series of Supreme Court decisions on that system. The need
for amendment of the original statute is shown and a sketch of the issues raised by the 1972 amendments is presented. The Note next focuses on the Streatch decision, with primary emphasis on Judge Hill's
imaginative treatment of the exclusivity provision of section 905(b).
Subsequent cases that have dealt with this issue and have refused to
follow the reasoning of the Streatch court are discussed and contrasted.
The Note then concludes that Streatch's imposition of strict products
liability is not at variance with the purpose of the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA--elimination of the danger of double payments by stevedores-as that danger is not present in a strict products liability action.
To clarify the following discussion, a few basic terms need to be
defined. The parties involved in the longshoremen's compensation system are the longshoreman, the stevedore, and the vessel owner. The
terms longshoreman and stevedore, although synonymous historically,
have changed through common usage to the point that the term stevedore is now used to indicate the longshoreman's employer. 8 The vessel
owner is the person or corporate entity who hires the stevedoring company to perform loading and off-loading services for the vessel owner.
In disputes between these parties, an admiralty plaintiff may sue not
only the vessel owner for injuries suffered on a vessel, but also may
assert property interests in the vessel.9 Although jurisdictional differences exist in these two types of suits, both are within the admiralty
6. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) (added by Act of Oct. 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-576,
§ 18(a), 86 Stat. 1263 (1972)).
7. 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
8. See G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 442-44 (2d ed. 1975)
[hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK].
9. The admiralty courts allow actions asserting personal liability by claimants inper-

sonam against a named natural or corporate person and asserting a property interest in a
tangible thing in rem against the tangible thing (normally a ship). GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 8, at 35-37.
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jurisdiction of the federal courts.10

Historical Development
Longshoremen have not always had access to the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts. The extension of admiralty jurisdiction to
longshoremen occurred in 1914 when the Supreme Court held that ad-

miralty jurisdiction was proper in a suit by an injured longshoreman
against his employer, a stevedore, for injuries which occurred on a vessel in navigable waters. I I Twelve years later, in InternationalStevedoring Co. v. Haverty,'2 the Court expanded the Jones Act, 13 which had

allowed suits by seamen against negligent employers for employment
related injuries,' 4 to include not only traditional seamen but longshore-

men as well. 15 As a result of Haverty, longshoremen could bring negligence actions under the liberalized provisions of the Jones Act and6
avoid the hazards of the common law doctrines of fellow servant,'

contributory negligence, and assumption of risk. 17 Shortly after the
Haverty decision, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 192718 which, although severely restricting the usefulness of Haverty to longshoremen, did establish a
longshoremen's compensation system. The LHWCA provided, among

other things, that the statutory compensation paid by the stevedore
would be the exclusive remedy against an employer for personal injuries suffered by longshoremen in the course of employment. 19 The
10. The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts, a complex and interesting subject,
is beyond the scope of this Note. Unless otherwise noted federal jurisdiction will be presumed throughout the remainder of the Note. For an excellent discussion of admiralty jurisdiction, see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 18-50.
11. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). Navigable waters are defined as "[tihose waters which afford a channel for useful commerce." BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 1179 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
12. 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
13. Merchant Marine Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, § 20, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920)
(popularly known as the Jones Act).
14. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 328-29, 335.
15. International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926). Justice Holmes gave
an interesting lesson in statutory analysis when he stated: "It is true that for most purposes,
as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not 'seamen.' But words are flexible. The
work upon which the plaintiff was engaged was a maritime service formerly rendered by the
ship's crew. . . . [W]e are of the opinion. .. that in this statute 'seamen' is to be taken to
... Id at 52.
include stevedores employed in maritime work on navigable waters.
16. The fellow servant rule provided that "the employer was not liable for injuries
caused solely by the negligence of a fellow servant." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 80, at 528 (4th ed. 1971).
17. GILMORE & BLACK, supranote 8, at 354-57.
18. Ch. 509, §§ 1-51, 44 Stat. 1424 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950
(1976)).
19. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat.
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LHWCA also contained a provision which was to become the avenue
for judicial circumvention of the exclusive liability provision. This section allowed the longshoreman to bring a third party suit2 20 if "some
person other than the employer [was] liable in damages." '
The potential for circumvention of the exclusive liability provision
by the use of third party suits developed through a series of decisions
which expanded the remedy of unseaworthiness. In early admiralty
law, the unseaworthiness of a vessel could be used by a seaman as a
defense to the charge of desertion. 22 The unseaworthiness doctrine
gradually expanded to become a cause of action for seamen's personal
injuries 23 and in time became so potent that it placed an absolute and
nondelegable duty on a ship owner to provide a seaworthy ship. 24 The
scope of this duty was defined succinctly by the Supreme Court in 1960:
"The duty is absolute, but it is a duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended use."' 25 As the scope of
the duty grew so did the number of parties covered by its protection.
The remedy was extended to cover longshoremen in 194626 and thereafter to other groups of maritime workers such as carpenters, 27 repairmen, 28 electricians, 2 9 ship cleaners, 30 and riggers. 3 1 It even grew to
1426 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976)). The Act was designed to provide
absolute recovery for injuries as prescribed in the compensation rate structure. The longshoreman traded the right to bring suit, with a lawsuit's uncertain outcome, for the security
of compensation. The stevedore, on the other hand, traded the right to defend the suit, and
escape liability, for the same certain outcome. Savings in administrative costs were to accrue
to both parties.
20. The term "third party suit" refers to a suit by a person covered by a compensation
system against a party who is not part of the compensation system where the suit stems from
an injury that occurs during the course of employment. A suit by a longshoreman against a
vessel or vessel owner that stems from an injury which occurred on the vessel in the course
of employment would be a third party suit. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 410.
21. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 33(a), 44 Stat.
1424, 1440 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 933(a) (1976)).
22. Dixon v. The Cyrus, 7 F. Cas. 755 (D. Pa. 1789) (No. 3,930). According to Gilmore
and Black, The Cyrus was the first American case holding that the shipowner owed a duty to
the seaman to provide a seaworthy ship. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 384.
23. The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). The Court stated in dictum the well established
principle that "the vessel and her owners are. . . liable to an indemnity for injuries received
by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship, or a failure to supply and keep
in order the proper applicances appurtenant to the ship." Id at 175.
24. Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
25. Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539, 550 (1960).
26. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
27. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
28. Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1953).
29. Feinman v. A.H. Bull S.S. Co., 216 F.2d 393 (3d Cir. 1954).
30. Torres v. The Kastor, 227 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1955).
31. Amerocean S.S. Co. v. Copp, 245 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1957).
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cover an unsafe condition introduced by the stevedore. 32 The remedy
thus had become a "species of liability without fault" 3 3 and "a form of
absolute duty owing to all within the range of its humanitarian pol34
icy."
The burden of providing a seaworthy vessel lay solely upon the
vessel owner even though the unseaworthiness might have been caused
by the stevedore.3 5 The Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic
Steamship Corp.,36 however, limited the impact of this liability by allowing the vessel owner to obtain indemnity from a negligent stevedore. In Ryan, a stevedore had negligently stowed cargo which broke
free during off-loading operations and injured a longshoreman. At issue was whether the stevedore must indemnify the vessel owner absent
an express agreement to that effect. The Court held that the stevedore
had breached an implied "warranty of workmanlike service" and
thereby had become liable to reimburse the vessel owner for any damages which the longshoreman might recover from the owner under the
unseaworthiness doctrine. 37 The warranty of workmanlike service
quickly grew beyond the facts of Ryan to encompass situations in
which the warranty was breached when the stevedore failed to correct
an unseaworthy condition within the responsibility of the vessel owner,
condiwhen the stevedore's employees caused the vessel's unseaworthy
38
tion, and even when the stevedore had not been negligent.
The Ryan decision seemed equitable because it allowed the vessel
owner to shift the burden of its unseaworthiness liability to the negligent stevedore. The decision, however, amounted to a judicial dismantling of the legislative compensation system. Compensation under the
LHWCA was intended to be the exclusive remedy of the injured longshoreman against the stevedore. 39 Under the line of decisions culminating in Ryan, however, the longshoreman could recover from the
vessel owner under the unseaworthiness remedy and the vessel owner
could implead the stevedore for indemnification if the stevedore had
breached the implied warranty of workmanlike service. The result, de32. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affg 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
33. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94 (1946).
34. Id at 95.
35. Alaska S.S. Co. v. Petterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954), affg 205 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953).
36. 350 U.S. 124 (1956) (on rehearing).
37. Id at 133-35. The Court considered this warranty akin to the "manufacturer's warranty of the soundness of its manufactured product." Id
38.

GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 444.

39. "The liability of an employer prescribed in section 4 [for compensation] shall be
exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee. . . ." Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 5, 44 Stat. 1426 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (1976)).
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scribed as circular liability4° for obvious reasons, is the same as a direct
suit by the longshoreman against the stevedore, which was not permitted under the LHWCA.
The Supreme Court further weakened the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA in Reed v. Steamship Yaka, 4 1 allowing a longshoreman hired directly by the charterer of a vessel to bring a suit
directly against his employer using the unseaworthiness remedy. The
plaintiff was injured when a defective plank of a pallet upon which he
was standing broke. The court could find no economic difference between granting relief "in this case, where the owner acted as his own
stevedore, and in one in which the owner hires an independent company."'42 Nonetheless, Yaka violated the statutory mandate that compensation would be the exclusive remedy between an injured
longshoreman and his employer.43 Yaka has been criticized for flouting the exclusive remedy provision of the LHWCA 44 but, despite the
criticism, the decision stood unaltered until 1972.45 Thus, when Congress began to consider amendments to the LHWCA, the compensation
system had been circumvented and the exclusive remedy provision effectively rendered useless by the combined effects of Ryan and Yaka.
40. This alignment of parties became the blueprint for actions by injured longshoremen
following the Ryan decision and this type of suit became known as a "circular liability suit."
HearingsBefore the Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education andLabor
on the Longshoreman's and Harbor Workers' CompensationAct Amendments of 1972, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48 (1972) (statement of James D. Hodgson).
One result of this "circular liability" was that the employer often in effect made double
payments, by making LHWCA payments and by indemnifying vessel owners. See H.R.
REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. 1-2, reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
4698, 4698-99. However, the statutes and even the unseaworthiness doctrine itself did not
require such a result. Indeed, former section 933(a) of Title 33 required a longshoreman to
elect between accepting compensation under the LHWCA and seeking damages in a third
party suit. See Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, ch. 509, § 33(a),
44 Stat. 1424, 1440 (1927). This section was amended in 1959 to eliminate the requirement
of election. Such an amendment did not endorse double recovery, however; the legislative
history for the 1959 amendment clearly contemplates that double recovery would not be
permitted. See S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959), reprintedin [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2134, 2135; see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. United States, 290 F.2d
257, 258 (2d Cir. 1961). Nonetheless, in practice such double payments did occur.
41. 373 U.S. 410 (1963).
42. Id. at 414. The rule in Yaka was extended to an actual owner in Jackson v. Lykes
Brothers Steamship Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
43. See note 39 supra.
44. See, e.g., Bue, In the Wake ofReed v. The S.S. Yaka, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 795 (1967).
45. See Note, The Vessel as Employer Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' CompensationAct-The Yaka Lives On, 23 Loy. L. REV. 571,
579-84 (1977) (discussing the continuing vitality of Yaka).
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The 1972 Amendments to the LHWCA
The need for a wholesale revision of the LHWCA was the subject
of a twelve year debate 46 culminating in the enactment of the LHWCA
amendments in 1972. 47 The debate stemmed from the longshoremen's
desire to increase benefits under the LHWCA and the stevedores' de-

sire to revitalize the exclusive remedy provisions of the compensation
system.48 The 1972 amendments were a political compromise designed
to achieve both goals.
The original exclusive liability section of the LHWCA 4 9 was re-

tained virtually intact by the amendments and is now codified at section 905(a) of Title 33 of the United States Code. To revitalize the

original exclusive liability provision, however, Congress enacted the
detailed section 905(b) 50 which provides:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter5 1 caused
by the negligence of a vessel, 52 then such person, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages by reason thereof, may bring an
action against such vessel as a third party ... and the employer shall
not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly and
any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void ....

The

liability of the vessel under this subsection shall not be based upon
the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach thereof at the time the
injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection shall be exremedies availclusive of all other remedies
53 against the vessel except
able under this chapter.

Section 905(b) has three important features. First, it removed the unseaworthiness remedy in actions by injured longshoremen against ves-

sels or vessel owners. 54 Courts interpreting section 905(b) have
46. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
47. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-576, §§ 1-22, 86 Stat. 1256-65 (amending 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1970)). For a
good overview of the amendments see Gorman, The Longshoremen'rand Harbor Workers'
Compensation At-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MARITIME L. & COMM. 1 (1974).
48. S. REP. No. 92-1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1972).
49. See note 39 supra for the pertinent text.
50. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
51. Although other parties are covered by the chapter, this Note will deal only with the
amendments' impact on longshoremen.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) (1976) provides: "The term 'vessel' means any vessel upon
which or in connection with which any person entitled to benefits under this chapter suffers
injury or death arising out of or in the course of his employment, and said vessel's owner,
owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter [sic] or bare boat charterer, master, officer, or
crew member."
53. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
54. In Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 569 F.2d 507 (9th Cir. 1978), the
court, in applying a negligence standard to an action by a longshoreman injured on a vessel,
concluded that the facts supporting the plaintiff's claim were so weak that "[t]o hold [the
defendant] liable in this case would be a return to the strict liability unseaworthiness doctrine which Congress has eliminated." Id at 514.
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enforced this aspect of the amendment effectively in actions by longshoremen, 55 although the remedy remains available to seamen, its original beneficiaries. Second, the section overruled the implied warranty
of workmanlike service which ran from stevedores to vessel owners and
declared void any indemnification agreement between a stevedore and
a vessel owner. 56 Although the language of section 905(b) appears
clear enough in this respect, the statutory term "vessel" 57 has presented
some difficulty for the courts. 5 8 Despite this difficulty, this feature
55. See, e.g., Boncich v. M.P. Howlett, Inc. 421 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1976): "Since
the allegedly defective cable . . . [which caused the injury] constituted gear, appliances, or
appurtenances once covered by the seaworthiness doctrine, and the 1972 amendments expressly eliminated claims based on unseaworthiness, a claim based on the 'defective' cable
... Id at 1303. The statutory language
cannot be. . .cognizable under the [LHWCA].
has overruled the Sieracki decision, cited at note 26 supra.
56. The second feature was in recognition of the superior economic power of the vessel
owner who had the ability to exact an indemnification provision from the stevedore.
57. For a statutory definition of the term vessel see note 52 supra. Under section 905(b)
if the party seeking indemnification is within the definition of the term "vessel," indemnification will be denied, and the court must view any "hold harmless" indemnification agreement as void. St. Julien v. Diamond M Drilling, 403 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. La. 1975), offers a
pristine example of the 1972 amendments in operation. There the court applied the provisions to preclude an indemnification suit by a vessel owner against a stevedore where a
longshoreman's negligence action against the vessel owner had been settled. The court
stated the obvious statutory construction when it said that "ft]he 1972 Amendments wiped
out the liability of LHWCA employers for contractual indemnity, express or implicit." Id
at 1259.
58. The courts have split on whether to give the term vessel a narrow or expansive
definition. In Gould v. General Mills, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 1181 (W.D.N.Y. 1976), for example, a longshoreman brought an action against the owner of a grain elevator who then filed a
third party complaint against the stevedore for indemnification. The court read the statutory
definition of "vessel" and found that § 905(b) was wholly inapplicable to the case. On the
stevedore's motion to dismiss the third party claim, the court held that, since § 905(b) did
not apply, § 905(a) was the only other provision which could preclude the stevedore's liability. Because § 905(a) is not a shield to the stevedore, the court went on to hold that the
stevedore had "breached its warranty to provide qualified personnel and its independently
implied obligations. . . to perform the job in a good, safe and workmanlike manner." Id
at 1184. Gould shows that not all the vestiges of Ryan are gone even though the Supreme
Court has indicated in dictum that it views the 1972 amendments as reviving the exclusive
liability provisions of§ 905(a). Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106,
112-13 (1974). On the other hand, the court in Spadola v. Viking Yacht Co., 441 F. Supp.
798 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), held true to the Supreme Court's dictum in a case where a longshoreman was injured on the dock when a truck rolled over his foot during a loading operation.
The stevedore paid the longshoreman benefits under the LHWCA. The longshoreman
brought suit against the owner of the truck for concurrent negligence and the truck owner
sought contribution or indemnification from the stevedore. The court held that there could
be no contribution by joint tortfeasors where one of the tortfeasors had paid benefits under
the LHWCA, that § 905(b) precluded indemnity agreements, and that § 905(a) made the
stevedore's compensation liability exclusive. This court was not as concerned as the Gould
court in giving a strict construction to the term "vessel," and it found a broad construction
proper in light of the substantive evil (indemnification agreements between stevedores and
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largely has been implemented. The third feature of section 905(b), creation of a negligence action for use by injured longshoremen as an exclusive remedy against the "vessel," has proved the most difficult of the
three to effectuate. First, the statute states that negligence determines a
vessel's liability but is silent, as is the legislative history, as to the applicable standard of care.5 9 Congressional guidance indicates only that
injured longshoremen should be treated as land-based employees 60 and
6t
that the negligence remedy should be a matter of uniform federal law.
Due to this lack of guidance, the courts have been unable to agree on
the appropriate standard of care. 62 Second, and more importantly, the
exclusivity of the negligence action, enacted to eliminate the problem
controversy in
of double payments by stevedores, was the focus of the
63
Ltd
Transportation,
Container
Associated
Streatch v.

Streatch
The plaintiff in Streatch was a longshoreman injured on board the
defendant's vessel when the brakes and steering on the vehicle he was
driving failed, causing the vehicle to crash against a bulkhead. The
plaintiff was acting in the course of his employment, using the vehicle
to unload cargo. The vehicle was maintained and controlled by the
other parties) at which the 1972 amendments were aimed. The court was willing, therefore,
to apply § 905(b) against the owner of the injury-causing truck.
59. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4703-04. "The purpose of the amendments is to place an
employee injured aboard a vessel in the same position he would be if he were injured in
non-maritime employment ashore .... " H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6
(1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4703.
60. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4703.
61. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4705.
62. See, e.g., Hurst v. Triad Shipping Co., 554 F.2d 1237 (3d Cir. 1977) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 409-429); Gay v. Ocean Transport & Trading, Ltd., 546
F.2d 1233 (5th Cir. 1977) (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 342-343(A));
Gallardo v. Westfal-Larsen & Co. A/S, 435 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (applying a general standard of care dependent upon the defendant vessel owner's knowledge of unreasonably dangerous conditions on board the vessel); Cummings v. "Sidarma" Soc., 409 F. Supp.
869 (E.D. La. 1976) (using tort principles of independent contractor's liability based upon
the degree of control exercised by the stevedore). See also Note, The InjuredLongshoreman
vs. The Shipowner after 1972 Business Invitees, Land-Based Standards,and Assumption of
Risk, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 771 (1977) (arguing against a standard of care based upon plaintiff's
status as a business invitee and for a standard of reasonable care based upon defendant's
knowledge of unreasonably dangerous conditions on the vessel); Note, The Vessel Owner's
Standardof Care Under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen r andHarbor Workers'
CompensationAct, 23 LoY. L. REv. 986, 1004-05 (1977) (arguing that RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 343-343(A) (business invitee) is equivalent to a maritime standard of
reasonable care under the circumstances of the case).
63. 388 F. Supp. 935 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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vessel owner and was carried on board the vessel from port to port for
use in cargo handling. The vehicle had been provided, "for consideration," by the vessel owner to the employer stevedoring company on the
day of the accident. Plaintiff brought an action against the vessel owner based on strict products liability. The defendant moved to dismiss,
contending that a strict liability claim by a longshoreman against a vessel owner was barred by the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA. In
ruling on the motion, the court felt it necessary to decide three issues:
(1) [Wjhether, even absent the 1972 amendments affecting a longshoreman's rights, a strict liability claim is cognizable by a federal
court under federal maritime law; (2) whether the 1972 amendments
bar Plaintiffs strict liability cause of action; and (3) whether the vessel owner in this case has the requisite status with regard to the allegto render the
edly defective vehicle and the injured longshoreman
64
owner suable on a strict liability theory.
Each will be treated separately in the following discussion with emphasis on the court's imaginative treatment of the second issue.
The court first addressed the issue of whether strict products liability has a place in federal maritime law which, the court noted, stems
primarily from historic admiralty principles and federal statutory and
case law. 65 Widely accepted common law principles of the states, however, when not inconsistent with existing admiralty rules, also may be
used in federal maritime law. 66 The practice of absorbing attractive
common law rules from the states keeps admiralty law contemporary
and capable of addressing new issues. The Streatch court mentioned
three district court cases in admiralty which in using this absorption
67
practice had held manufacturers strictly liable for defective products.
These cases allowed recovery based upon implied warranty, a contract
theory. The two earlier cases cited by the court involved crashes of
aircraft into navigable waters. 68 The Streatch court, through an analysis of admiralty jurisdiction requirements, concluded that strict products liability theory had been recognized by these cases in admiralty.
The court noted the jurisdictional impossibility of a recovery on a nonmaritime contract in an admiralty court, 69 as the admiralty jurisdiction
64. Id at 937.
65. Id at 937-38. Accord, Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383, 388 (1941).
66. 388 F. Supp. at 937-38.
67. Id. at 938 (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 345 F.
Supp. 395 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Montgomery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960)).
68. Montogmery v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 231 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
Middlleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F. Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
69. 388 F. Supp. at 938. For a good discussion of the jurisdictional problem of implied
warranty recoveries in admiralty see Annot., 7 A.L.R. Fed. 502, 510-12 (1971). See also
McCune, MaritimeProductsLiability, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 831 (1967) (arguing that "warranty"
cases of this type are really actions in tort).
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of the federal courts can be invoked only when "maritime" causes of
action are involved. For a contract cause of action to lie in admiralty,

the contract must relate to the navigation, business, or commerce of the
sea.70 Although the two aircraft crash cases did not involve maritime
contracts, the courts rationalized their holdings under the contract the-

ory of implied warranty. If these recoveries actually were in contract,
the courts could not have exercised their admiralty jurisdiction. On the

other hand, for a tort cause of action to lie in admiralty the tort must
have occurred upon navigable waters. 7 ' Thus, unless the cases were
viewed as tort claims stemming from the crashes into navigable waters,
a jurisdictional defect 72 was created. Accordingly, the Streatch court
liability in admiralty
viewed these cases as recognizing strict products
73
under the misnomer of implied warranty.

The third case cited by the Streatch court, Sears,Roebuck & Co. v.
American PresidentLines, Ltd, 7 4 was given the same analysis as the
two aircraft crash cases, although it involved a defectively designed
hatch system which malfunctioned and damaged cargo. The Streatch
court treated this case as one of implied warranty, but the Sears court
also placed its holding on the ground of strict products liability. 75 Although the Streatch court categorized the holding of the Sears decision

with the two aircraft crash cases and applied the same analysis to all
three, the fact that the Sears decision was based in part upon strict

products liability provides even greater support to the Streatch court's
conclusion that strict products liability is cognizable in admiultimate
76
ralty.
The second issue before the court, whether a longshoreman's strict
liability claim against a vessel could stand in the face of the exclusive
70. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 21. The jurisdiction of the admiralty courts is
a fascinating and intricate subject which is beyond the scope of this Note. For a good discussion of admiralty jurisdiction see GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8, at 18-50.
71. The Supreme Court modified the "locality" rule of maritime torts in aircraft cases
by requiring that "the wrong bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity."
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972).
72. McCune, MaritimeProductsLiability, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 831 (1967). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A), Comment m, at 355-56 (1965).
73. 388 F. Supp. at 938.
74. 345 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
75. Id at 402.
76. 388 F. Supp. at 938. The Ninth Circuit has approved this holding and has held that
strict products liability based upon § 402(A) of the Second Restatement of Torts is within
admiralty. Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc., v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 113436 (9th Cir. 1977). Cf. Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416 F.2d 217 (6th Cir.
1969) (design defect in electric dumbwaiter gave rise to a products liability claim in admiralty); Dudley v. Bayou Fabricators, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 788 (S.D. Ala. 1971) (products liability action predicated on negligent design). See also Edelman, ProductsLiability in Maritime
Law, 14 FoRUM 230 (1978).
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negligence remedy provision of section 905(b) of the LHWCA,
presented a question of first impression. Looking to the legislative history of section 905(b), the court noted that "[tlhe purpose of the amendments is to place an employee injured aboard a vessel in the same
position he would be [sic] if he were injured in non-maritime employment ashore. '7 7 To place the longshoreman in the "same position" as a
land-based employee the court felt that78the longshoreman should have
the remedy of strict products liability.
The language of section 905(b), however, stated that "[t]he negligence remedy provided in this subsection shall be exclusive of all other
remedies against the vessel."'79 To overcome this apparent stumbling
block, the court construed the language to apply to a negligence action
against vessel owners only as vessel owners and attributed to vessel
owners a split personality: vessel owner for the purposes of section
905(b) and provider of a defective product for the purposes of strict
products liability. 80 The court's recognition of this dual function of a
vessel owner allows longshoremen "to sue a vessel for strict liability in
the same situations in which a non-maritime worker could sue for strict
liability."8 ' The longshoreman therefore is not placed in a lesser position than a shoreside worker with respect to third party rights. Practically speaking, this rationale would allow longshoremen, if they were
shoreside workers, in almost every state to sue vessel owners despite
stevedores' contributions under the LHWCA, as presently, in fortyeight states, shoreside workers may bring products liability actions
the workers' employer is
against equipment manufacturers even though
82
paying workers' compensation benefits.
The distinction between the unseaworthiness remedy, abolished
for longshoremen by section 905(b), and strict products liability, authorized in Streatch, is important in an evaluation of the court's con77. 388 F. Supp. at 939 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972),
reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs, 4698, 4703).

78.

388 F. Supp. at 940.

79.

33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976) (emphasis added).

80. 388 F. Supp. at 940. The Supreme Court has given theoretical support to this analysis in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 99 S.Ct. 2753 (1979), where, in a
different context, the Court stated "it is necessary only to construe the second sentence [of

§ 905(b)] to permit a third-party suit against the vessel providing its own loading and unloading services where negligence in its nonstevedoring capacity contributes to the injury."
Id.at 2759. The Court recognized that even when a vessel directly hires longshoremen it

retains its capacity as a vessel and will not be treated strictly as a stevedore. Thus, the Court
attributed to the vessel a dual capacity, or personality, as a vessel for the purposes of the

negligence remedy and as a stevedore for the purposes of the employment relation.
81. 388 F. Supp. at 940.
82. Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace- The Effect of Workers' Compensation
on The Rights and Liabilitiesof Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035, 1041 n.22.
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clusion.83 As mentioned earlier, the unseaworthiness remedy placed an
absolute and nondelegable duty on the vessel owner to provide a ship
which was reasonably fit for its intended use.84 This broad and absolute duty stands in contrast to the narrower common law remedy of
strict products liability.
Strict liability has been defined as liability for the sale of a "product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer," when that product causes harm to the user or consumer.85 The
seller must be engaged in the business of selling the product and the
86
product must reach the user or consumer without substantial change.
Further, as the name implies, liability exists even though the seller has
exercised all possible care.8 7 The public policy behind imposing strict
liability is that the economic burden of injuries caused by defective
by the parties who market those products as a
products should be 8borne
8
cost of production.
In contrast to the economic policy underlying strict products liability, the policy underlying unseaworthiness is the humanitarian one that
a seaman who is totally dependent upon a vessel for safety has a right
to a vessel which is reasonably fit for its intended use. 89 Thus, proof of
unseaworthiness requires that the plaintiff show that the vessel on
which the injury occurred was not reasonably fit. Under this doctrine
any defective condition on board the vessel which proximately caused
personal injury would be unreasonable, thereby making the vessel unseaworthy. 90 In contrast, strict products liability requires that a product
be shown to be unreasonably dangerous.9 '
The distinction between the two concepts is a fine one, but the
practical effect of this distinction is to make the plaintiffs burden in an
unseaworthiness action much less than in a strict products liability action. The additional requirement in strict products liability actions of
proof that the defective product was unreasonably dangerous demonstrates that unseaworthiness and strict liability are discrete legal concepts which should not be equated in an analysis of whether strict
83. Some courts have used the term "strict liability unseaworthiness" -loosely when
describing the longshoreman's remedy that was abolished by the 1972 amendments. See,
e.g., Davison v. Pacific Inland Navigation Co., 569 F.2d 507, 514 (9th Cir. 1978).
84. See notes 24-25 & accompanying text supra.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1965).
86. Id
87. Id
88. Id, Comment c, at 349-50.
89. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
90. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 8 at 383-404.
91. The California Supreme Court has rejected the requirement of unreasonable dangerousness in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
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liability should apply in an action by an injured longshoreman against
a vessel owner.
In light of this distinction between the concepts, specific congressional guidance as to the viability of strict products liability after the
1972 amendments would have been significant, if not determinative, of
the issue. Unfortunately, although the unseaworthiness remedy was
92
addressed in section 905(b), neither that section nor the House Report
accompanying the 1972 amendments addressed the applicability of
strict products liability. The Report did discuss two extreme proposals
considered and rejected by Congress, 93 but Congress chose a more
moderate approach and fashioned the negligence remedy of section
905(b). In deliberations prior to the passage of section 905(b), Congress
addressed the third party products liability action based on negligence, 94 but the pure strict products liability action, not involving negligence, apparently was not considered in drafting the 1972 amendments.
Absent indications of congressional intent, application of the theory of the dual functions of a vessel owner, as vessel owner and as
supplier of products, provides an opportunity to examine whether strict
products liability should apply in the face of the exclusive remedy provision of section 905(b). If the action is by a longshoreman against a
vessel owner, the exclusive remedy provision dictates that the vessel
owner's liability must be based on negligence. But, if the action is by a
longshoreman against the supplier of a defective product, section
905(b) would not apply. For example, a longshoreman would not be
precluded from suing the manufacturer of a defective component of the
vessel if that manufacturer was not the vessel owner.95 In that situation, the legal relationship arising from the longshoreman's injury
caused by a defective product is outside section 905(b) because the
is not suing for injuries caused by the negligence of the
longshoreman
"vessel."'9 6 Furthermore, the action is not foreclosed by the provision
92. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-8 (1972), reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 4698, 4701-05.
93. One proposal was to include the vessels in the compensation system, and the other
was to hold the vessels liable for any injury to longshoremen which occurred on board a
vessel without regard to the vessel's fault. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1972), reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4698, 4702. The Streatch court
felt that this congressional reference to liability without fault was merely an "imprecise synonym" for unseaworthiness. 388 F. Supp. at 940.
94. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972:
Hearingson S. 2318, S.525 andS. 1547 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Public Welfare, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 270-71 (1972).

95. Cf.Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (plaintiff
permitted to sue manufacturer of a component of an aircraft carrier because he was precluded from suing the United States government, the manufacturer of the ship).
96. See Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 924 (1978); Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 430 F. Supp. 527
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that the negligence remedy is the exclusive remedy against the "vessel"
because the suit would be against the component manufacturer and not
the "vessel." Similarly, the longshoreman who brings a products liability action is not suing the "vessel" but is suing the vessel owner in its
capacity as supplier of a defective product. Therefore, section 905(b)
should not be interpreted to preclude a suit by a longshoreman injured
by a defective product against the vessel owner as supplier of the defective product.
An'additional reason for permitting a strict products liability action against a vessel owner is that allowing such an action will not revive a harm which the 1972 amendments sought to eliminate. As
discussed earlier, the doctrine of unseaworthiness led to circular liability, the end result of which was that a stevedore in effect made double
payments to a longshoreman by paying LHWCA benefits and by indemnifying the vessel owner. This was one harm at which the 1972
amendments were aimed. The imposition of strict products liability,
however, creates no danger of resurrecting that problem because the
vessel owner, as the manufacturer or supplier of a defective product,
cannot transfer the burden of compensating damages caused by that
product to an outside source, ie., the stevedore. Thus, the rationale
behind the elimination of the unseaworthiness remedy carries no force
when a strict products liability action is urged.
Other courts which have dealt with the issue of whether the negligence remedy provided by section 905(b) is the longshoreman's exclusive remedy against the vessel owner have been less searching in their
analyses. Two courts have concluded summarily that the 1972 amendments mandate that a negligence action is the only theory upon which
an injured longshoreman can recover against a vessel owner.97 One
other court analyzed the issue more thoroughly, but nonetheless
reached a conclusion contrary to the Streatch holding. In Boncich v.
M.P. Howlett, Inc.,98 the court considered a set of facts which represented a typical unseaworthiness claim. The plaintiff longshoreman
was injured by the boom of a crane which fell after a topping lift cable
holding the boom had parted. The court found Streatch unpersuasive
on the issue of whether the 1972 amendments limited a longshoreman
to a negligence remedy against the vessel owner.99 The court, disagree(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'don othergrounds,572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978); Boncich v. M.P. Howlett, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
97. "The language of the statute defeats the plaintiff's claim that § 905(b) is not his
exclusive avenue of remedy. . . . Remaining is the maritime worker's right to sue for negligence only." Hess v. Upper Mississippi Towing Corp., 559 F.2d 1030, 1032 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied,435 U.S. 924 (1978). .4ccord, Lubrano v. Royal Netherlands S.S. Co., 430 F.
Supp. 527, 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 572 F.2d 364 (2d Cir. 1978).
98. 421 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
99. Id at 1302.
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ing with the reasoning of Streatch, stated that strict tort liability was
addressed and precluded by the prohibition against the unseaworthiness remedy and that allowing strict tort liability would not serve the
legislative goal of promoting vessel owner responsibility.10 0 Further,
the court held that Streatch was inapplicable to the facts before it because the defendant owner in the case "was neither a manufacturer,
distributor, bailor, nor lessor engaged in putting an allegedly defective
product into the stream of commerce." 10' Thus, three of the four courts
addressing the issue have held that the longshoreman should be limited
the
to a negligence remedy against the vessel owner although one of
02
courts distinguished the Streatch holding from the facts it faced.1
The third issue of the Streatch case, "whether. . .the relationship
of the vessel owner to the Plaintiff with respect to the vehicle in question makes the vesselowner a proper defendant within the definitional
limits of strict liability in tort,"' 0 3 also presented a question of first impression. 104 The matter was before the court on a motion to dismiss the
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 05
The parties, however, had not briefed this particular issue and hence
the court did not have a complete statement of the relevant facts bearing on the ultimate liability of the vessel owner. These missing facts
included the vessel owner's involvement in the designing or building of
the vehicle, the nature of the agreement under which the stevedore was
allowed to use the vehicle, and whether the vessel owner was engaged
06
in an organized and continuing business relating to cargo vehicles.'
Despite this lack of facts, the court was forced to rule on the motion to
dismiss.
The court, although finding that products liability is recognized in
federal maritime law, noted that all previous cases involved suits
against the manufacturer or retailer of the allegedly defective product.
Because of the unseaworthiness doctrine, no such suits had been
the court
brought in admiralty against a vessel owner. Accordingly,
10 7
turned to the common law of California for guidance.
The court reviewed the development of products liability in California and noted that such liability, originally imposed on manufacturers and retailers, had been extended to include lessors, bailors, and
licensors under certain circumstances. This expansion was warranted,
100. Id at 1302-03.
101. Id.at 1304 (paraphrasing the test used in Streatch). Whether this court would apply
the Streatch strict liability formulation to applicable facts is an open question.
102. Boncich v. M.P. Howlett, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 1300, 1304 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
103. 388 F. Supp. at 941.
104. Id. at 941 n.4.
105. Id.at 936.
106. Id at 937.
107. Id at 941-42.
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the court noted, because "the underlying public policy and social justification for imposing strict liability . . pertain only to those people
engaged in the business qfproviding aproductto thepubliefor use by the
public."'0 8 Thus, under California law the application of the strict
products liability action to vessel owners is limited to those vessel owners who both are in the business of providing a product, presumably
related to the shipping industry, and are providing it to the public for
use by the public. The limits of the applicability of the action remain
unclear, however, as there has been little refinement of the phrases "engaged in the business" or "providing a product to the public."
As the issue appeared to the court in Streatch, the defendant could
have been a licensor and, as such, may be said to have placed the defective vehicle in the stream of commerce. The defendant received a consideration and permitted the vehicle to be used for its business benefit.
Similarly, the defendant might be said to have distributed a product "to
the public for use by the public." The court concluded, however, that
without the relevant facts mentioned earlier, it could not make a decision. 10 9 Accordingly, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. Refinement of the scope of vessel owners' potential liability thus
awaits further attention by the courts.

Conclusion
The 1972 amendments to the LHWCA were a reaction to judicial
interpretation of the LHWCA of 1927. A series of Supreme Court decisions had rendered ineffective the workers' compensation system between longshoremen and stevedores by permitting the longshoreman to
sue the vessel owner under the unseaworthiness remedy and by then
permitting the vessel owner to obtain indemnification from the stevedore. Restoring the integrity of the compensation system by cutting off
this "circular liability" and raising the amount of compensation available to longshoremen were two important aims of the 1972 amendments. To maintain the viability of longshoremen's actions outside of
the compensation system, however, Congress enacted section 905(b)" lO
which provides an "exclusive" negligence action against the vessel
owner.
Despite the supposed exclusivity of this negligence action, the conclusion of this Note is that allowing a strict products liability action
against a vessel owner would not offend the spirit or the letter of the
1972 amendments, as the reasoning behind permitting only a negligence action was the elimination of the danger of circular liability, a
108.
109.
110.

Id at 942 (emphasis by the court).
Id at 943.
33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1976).
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danger not present in a strict products liability action. Further, as the
Streatch court correctly concludes, a strict products liability action by
an injured longshoreman against a vessel owner who supplies a defective product should be outside the statute, because the action is not
against the "vessel" but is against the supplier of a defective product.
Recognition of the dual capacity of the vessel owner simply allows a
longshoreman to be treated as a land-based employee with respect to
third party strict products liability actions."'

111. See generally Weisgall, ProductLiability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers'
Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of ThirdParties, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1035.

